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"European Works Councils" - New Forms of European Labour Relations 
Regulation? 1 
Summary: 
F ollowing the adoption of the "Council Directive on the establishment of a European Works 
Council" (EWC) in September 1994 we can speak for the first time of a transnational system 
on labour relations based on European legislation. Even if the extent of the directive's regula­
tory capacity so far seems '10 be relatively poor, it may set in motion a certain dynamic in the 
process of formation of transnational labour relations at the level of Transnational Companies 
and Corporations (TNCs). 
The Single Market Programme of the mid-1980s was the beginning of a fundamental restruc­
tu ring process' for European capitaL Meanwhile, more and more companies have developed a 
European-wide integrated production network with various consequences for the national and 
local labour relations systems: Employee representatives and trade unions in the emerging 
"Euro-Company" are threaten by an incre'\sing pressure of "social dumping" because of inten­
sified competition between the different subsidiaries of a single TNC. The "Euro-Company's" 
management is forced to control and co-ordinate an ever more complex organisation and must 
find the best combination of using the various locational advantages as well as transferring the 
company's own "best-practice" experiences. 
European W orks Councils may become a new transnational regime to regulate labour relations 
in the "Euro-Company" and thereby help to support and stabilise a European-wide integrated 
production network. The development of a new transnational "micro-corporatism" would at 
the same time support the contemporary trend of undercutting· national, regional and/or branch 
level collective bargaining through a decentralisation of labour relations and a growing impor­
tance ofenterprise level regulation. 
Finally, labour relations in a "post-fordist" Europe will continue to erode the current mode of 
regulation in the different national systems. However, the development does not lead to a con­
verged European regulation system. The emerging structure can be described as a "neo­
voluntarist" system of "transnational pluralism", where new TNCs ensure company-specific 
regulations systems with relatively privileged working conditions for the core workforce, while 
for other. employees in non-TNC-companies there will still be no European social regulation 
able to compensate for the growing limitations of the widely deregulated national regulation, 
systems. 
An earlier draft of this paper originally was presente4 at the Second European Conference of Sociology 
"European Societies: Fusion or Fission", Budapest 30th August - 2nd September 1995. For comments 
and assistance I have to thank Dieter Plehwe and Kristin Hirschkom. 
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1. Tbe EU-Directive on European Works Councils 
Discussion on the necessity of transnational workers' representation in European-wide operat­
ing TNCs date back to the late 1960s (Schulten 1992). In 1970 the European Commission for 
the first time proposed to establish a "European Works Council" (EWC) as part of the in­
tended formation of a "European Company Statute". The suggested structure of the EWC at 
that time was mainly inspired by the German works council system including not only informa­
4 
tion and consultation but also further reaching co-determination rights. Subsequently, the 
European Commission was often accused oftrying to "germanise" European labour relations. 
The proposal failed not only because of the resistance of the European employers organisa­
tions, but also due to strongly diverging political and ideological orientations concerning in­
dustrial democracy among the various national trade unions (Nagels/Sorge 1977). 
In the early 1980s, the European Commission tried to find a new approach with the so called 
"Vredeling-Directive". Compared to earlier proposals this new directive was limited to certain 
transnational information and consultation rights. Nevertheless, a new transnational labour 
relations' mechanism was to be established covering all TNCs with important European activi­
ties and, therefore, was no longer connected with a European Conlpany Statute. However, the 
"Vredeling-Directive" never quite had the chance of being adopted by the European Council, 
not only because European employers started a massive lobbying campaign against it, but also 
- and mainly - because the political climate was changing in most European countries: Social­
democrats were replaced more and more by a new type ofneo-liberal political hegemony. 
The recent directive on "EWCs" was developed in the context of discussions on the "social 
dimension" ofthe European Single Market Programme and could be seen as probably the most 
important practical result of the Commission's Social Action Programme of 1989. The political 
process between the first presented draft of the directive in December 1990 and the finally 
adopted version in September 1994 has been described elsewhere in detail (Gold/Hall 1994; 
Schulten 1995b). Until the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, it seemed that the directive 
would have to suffer the same fate as its predecessors and the adoption would be prevented by 
the combined strength ofEuropean employers and the conservative British government block­
ing its adoption. The situation changed substantially after the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Because of the Maastricht Social Protocol and the special "opting-out ll arrangement 
for the United Kingdom, the passing of the directive was suddenly on the horizon of the Euro­
pean Council of Ministers. Quickly adjusting to the new situation the principle European em­
ployers organisation, UNICE, so far strongly opposed to any proposal for a legally binding 
EWe, offered to negotiate a common European collective agreement on the· issue for the 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), instead of demanding a European directive. In 
practice the gap inpolitical positions between the European "Social Partners" was too large to 
be bridged, negotiations failed before they really began. Finally, the European Council decided 
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to enact the directive under the Maastricht Social Protocol where it only needed a qualified 
voting majority among eleven member states. 
The current adopted directive is literally called "Council Directive on the establishment of a 
European· W orks Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community­
scale groups for the purpose of informing and consulting employees lt (Council 1994). The ti­
tlels emphasis is characteristic: In contrary to the notion of the 1970s, the present directive is 
not defining a single uniform model of a EWC. Instead it is referred to the "principle of auton­
omy" of the social actors. Therefore, the directive allows "representatives of employees and the 
management of the undertaking ... to determine by agreement the nature, comp 0 sition, the 
function, mode of operation, procedures and financial resources ofEuropean Works Councils. It 
(Council 1994: 65) This means that social actors within a single TNC are almost completely 
free to negotiate any kind of EWC they want. This also includes the possibility to refuse the 
establishment of a EWC or to agree about another "procedure" on information and consulta­
tion which, for example, could mean the use of already established national communication 
channels to iniOrm the employees about European affairs (Gold 1994). This "menu character" 
of the directive (Streeck/Vitols 1993: 18) suits by and large the position of the European em­
ployers who always criticised the "centralistic" and "bureaucratic" feature of the EWC and 
have instead advocated for Itflexible " , "decentralised" and less institutionalised information and 
consultation procedures (Multinational Business Forum 1993; MunzlNerb 1994). Under the 
new directive the concrete framework of an established EWC will be the result of a complex 
bargaining process reflecting the political power and the particular interests of the different 
social actors within every single TNC: 
Only if after aperiod of three years of negotiation the social actors are not able to find a com­
mon agreement, will the directivels so called Itsubsidiary requirements" case automatically be 
put into force (Council 1994: 71). These "subsidiary requirements" define a kind of minimum 
standard model of a EWC: There should be a EWC with a minimum of three and a maximum 
of 30 members including at least one employee representative from every national company 
organisation in the European Union member states (with the exception of Great Britain, which 
is not covered.by the directive). TheEWC has to meet at least once a year with the European 
central management for the purpose of information and consultation on various issues such as 
economic, financial, structural and social developments of the TNC. Additionally, when there 
are Itexceptional circumstances", for example "in the event of reallocations, the closure of es­
tablishments ... or collective redundancies" there should be lias soon as possible" an extra ad.:. 
hoc meeting, where employee representatives must be consulted. However, the directive em­
phasises that this extra meeting "shall not affect the prerogatives of the central management", 
which in other words means that the employee representatives have no legal rights to block 
management decisions. Finally, before the official annual meeting, employee representatives 
have the right to co me together without the presence of the management. This is so far the 
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only legally guaranteed opportunity for the employee representatives to meet independently 
from management for a common exchange ofviews and an autonomous policy development. 
In summary, the directive only defines a quite limited and relatively vague model of a EWC, 
while leaving most of the concrete arrangements to the bargaining process of the social actors 
in every single TNC. Therefore it can be supposed, that after all of the 1,200 or so TNCs af­
fected by the directive (Sisson et. al. 1992; WortmannlDörrenbächer 1994; EGI 1995) have 
established their EWCs (probably at the end of this century) there will be a great variety of 
company-specific, tailor-made models and arrangements. The current ongoing process of im­
•plementing the directive in nationallegislation of the EU member states - which has to be com­
pleted by September 1996 - will further widen the scope of different EWC's models because of 
the nationallatitude of interpretation in a number of directive's provisions (e.g. the financial 
resources for the EWC). All in all, the directive can be interpreted as a very clear expression of 
fundamentally changing patterns and political motivations of European Social Policy: While in 
the 1970s European Social Policy was mainly motivated by a social-democratic/corporatist 
approach to harmonise European social regulation and to create a European welfare state, with 
the neo-liberal agenda in the 1980s the pattern changed radically to an approach of "neo­
voluntarism" (Streeck 1994). "Neo-voluntarism" is characterized by "an emerging commitment 
to a decentralised regulatory regime with a preference for 'soft' over 'hard' law, and 'private' 
over 'public' order operating under a 'variable geometry' of participants that are protected from 
central intervention by ample opportunities for 'opting out', as weIl as by a general presumption 
of precedence of both market forces and local traditions over universalistic normative regula­
tion" (Streeck/Vitols 1993, 18f). 
2. European Works Councils in Practice 
To get an idea ofthe potential diversity ofthe prospective EWCs it might be useful to look at 
practical experiences, which have so far been collected in around 70 officially established 
EWCs based on "voluntary" agreements. From the trade union side there has been already in 
the 1960s strong initiatives to build up transnational co-operation structures within TNCs. But 
these bodies, known as "World Works Councils", were never officially recognised by manage­
ment and had - contrary to the expectations of some international trade union leaders 
(Levinson 1972) - nearly no practical influence on the regulation of labour relations. Since the 
mid-1970s most ofthe "World Works Councils" have disappeared (Tudyka 1985). In the sec­
ond half of the 1980s a few French Corporations, which were mostly state-owned and had 
elose relations to the French socialist govemment, started to build up European information 
committees (Rehfeld 1993, 1995; Lecher 1995). For the first time transnational forums on la­
, 
bour relations existed within TNCs, which were based on voluntary agreements between the 
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company's central management and employee representatives of the various national subsidiar­
ies. After the announcement of the first draft of the EWC directive in 1990 the European trade 
unions started -a massive campaign on the issue, organised various European meetings for em­
ployee representatives of the same TNC and forced employers to set up EWCs. But until 1994 
most of the European employers strongly opposed the whole EWC concept. Therefore there 
has been voluntarily established EWCs only in approximately 30 companies that time (Table 2). 
After the final adoption ofthe EU-Directive the situation changed dramatically. Now more and 
more employers are interested in a "voluntary agreement" with which they can bypass the Di­
rective's provisions. In autumn 1995 central management in approximately 70 TNCs officially 
agreed to have a kind ofEWC on a voluntary base (Table 1). 
Despite the fact that the existence of EWCs is a re1atively new phenomena, there are already a 
significant number of analysis and empirical studies on that issue (see for example: GoldIHall 
1992; Marginson 1992, Bonneton 1994; Stoop 1994; DärrenbächerlWortmann 1995; Hall et.al 
1995; Lecher 1995; KriegerIBonneton 1995; Schulten 1995b). A summary ofthis work has to 
mention at least five important points: 
1. 	 All the studies confirm a large variety and diversity among existing EWCs models. 
-Different titles of the EWC, such as "European Employee Forum", "European Eco­
nomic Committee", "Structure for European Social Dialogue" etc. already reflect the 
fact that there are numerous differences concerning the composition of the EWC, its 
mode of operation, the degree of institutionalisation, defined tasks and subjects of the 
agreement and - probably most importantly - the real chance for employee representa­
tives to influence the company's development on the European level. 
2. 	 Authors like Gold and Hall (1992) emphasised at an early stage of discussion, that be­
sides all of the diversity, there is something they called the "basic model", which is a 
EWC, in which central management and national employee representatives meet at least 
once a year for the purpose of information on the company's general economic and so­
cial development. This verypoor record of a EWC is probably better-named a 
"minimalistic model" because it lacks any consultation rights and therefore even falls 
behind the "subsidiary requirements" of the EWC-directive. Krieger and Bonneton 
(1995: 199) found in their study on 35 voluntary agreements that only three explicitly 
-formalised the right of early consultation in cases of upcoming important decisions. 
This right potentially has significant consequences for the workforce, in so far as em­
ployee representatives have a real chance. to influence management's strategic planning. 
All the other EWC agreements only talk about "information" or mention terms such as 
"exchange ofviews", "social dialogue" or even "consultation" in a very vague way. 
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Table 1: "Voluntary" Agreements on European Works Councils 
I Company Home Country Activity Date established 
Accor F Hotels & Catering 1994 
AGF F Insurance 1991 (1994) 
Bouygues F Construction 1995 
BuH F Information Technology 1988 (1992) 
Credit Lyonnais F Finance 1994 
. Danone (BSN) F Food Processing 1987 
Danone (BSN) F G1ass 1990 
ElfAquitaine F Petrochemicals 1991 (1994) 
Generale des Eaux F Construction Utilities 1993 
Lafarge Coppee F Cement 1994 
Lyonnaise des Eaux F Water Distribution, Construction 1995 
Pechiney F Containers 1990 (1992) 
Renault F Motor Manufacturing 1993 (1995) 
Rhone Poulence F Chemicals 1990 (1994) 
Saint-Gobain F Building Materials 1988 (1992) 
Schneider F Holding Company (inel. E1ectronics) 1993 
ThomsonCE F Information Technology 1985 (89190192) 
ThomsenCSF F Military Technology 1993 
Usinor Saci10r F Stee1 Production 1994 
ArgEvo 
, 
D Chemicals 1994 
Allianz D Insurance 1989 
BASF D Chemica1s 1995 
Bayer D Chemicals 1991 (1994) 
Beiersdorf D Chemicals 1994 
Berte1smann D Media 1994 
B Braun Me1sungen D Chemicals 1994 
Continental D Tyres and Rubber 1991 (1992/1993) 
FAG Kugelfischer D Machinery 1995 
Grundig D Household Appliances 1993 
Henkel D Chemicals 1995 
Hoechst D Chemicals 1991 (1994) 
Kaefer Isoliertechnik D Insulation 1995 
Preussag D Non-ferrous Metals 1995 
Sclunalbach-Lubeca D Packaging 1992 (1993) 
Schering D Chemica1s 1994 
Volkswagen D Motor Manufacturing 1992 (1995) 
Borealis N/SF Petrochemicals 1994 
E1ectrolux S Househo1d Appliances 1995 
Erricson S Communications Equipment 1995 
Hafslund Nycomed N Medical Products 1995 
ISS DK Cleaning Services 1995 
Kone SF Lift Manufacture 1995 
Myllykoski SF Paper 1994 
NokiaNCM SF Communications Equipment 1993 
NorskHydro N Chemicalsl Aluminium 1994 
SKF S Ball-Bearing Production 1994 
StenaLine . S Sea Transport 1993 
Vo1vo S Motor Manufacturing 1993 (1994) 
BP Oil Europe UK Petrochemicals 1994 
Coats Viyella UK Textiles 1995 
Marks & Spencer UK Retail 1995 
United Biscuits UK Food Processing 1994 
ENI I Energy and Chemicals 1995 
Eridania Beghin-Say I Food Processing 1995 
Italcimenti I Bui1ding Materials 1995 
Merloni E1ettrodomestici I Househo1d App1iances 1993 
PetroFina B Petrochemicals 1995 
Mayr Melnhof A Paper and Cardboard 1995 
Airbus fudustries FIDIE/UK Aerospace 1992 
Eurocopter DIF Aerospace 1992 
Europipe DIF Stee1 Pipes 1993 
Eurotunnel F/UK Transport 1994 
Lever Europe NL/UK Detergents 1993 
Nestle 
CPC 
Honda 
CH 
USA 
J 
Food Processing 
Food Processing 
Motor Manufacturing 
1990 
1994 (1995) 
1994 
Source: European Works Council Bulletin, Preview Issue, Winter 1995 
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3. 	TNCs with a1ready existing EWCs have, in around 70 Percent ofthe cases, their headquar­
ters in France or Germany (Table 2). The fact that the early prototype EWCs all came from 
French companies explains that the French works council system probably has the greatest 
influence on the whole EWC discussion and even on the Commission's directive. The over­
whelming majority of existing EWCs conceive themselves as joint management and em­
ployee representative bodies (like the French "comite de groupe') rather than a body with 
enlployee representation only (like the German "Konzembetriebsrat') (KriegerIBonneton 
1995: 193). Even in many German companies (for example in most ofthe firms from the 
chemical sector) the chosen EWC model is much closer to the French works council sys­
tem. This obviously has to do with the fact, that the employers have no interest in giving a 
EWC the right to participate in management's decisions. Even the rather exceptional EWC 
agreement at Volkswagen, which is probably the clüsest case to the German works council 
system, contains no co-determination rights (Schulten 1992; Mertes 1994). 
Table 2: "Voluntary" Agreements on European Works Councils (Summary) 
Country of origin Number Sector Number Date established Number 
Franee 
Gennany 
Seandinavian 
Countries 
Great Britain 
ltaly , 
Belgium 
Austria 
Switzerland 
Japan 
USA 
Transmitional 
Joint -Ventures 
19 
17 
12 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
Metal Industry 
Chemie al Industry 
Foodlndustry 
Construetion Industry 
Financial SeIViees 
Transport 
HotellRestaurants 
Communieations 
Others 
26 
20 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1 
4 
Before 1990 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Before 
September 1995 
5 
4 
5 
4 
11 
18 
19 
Total 66 Total 66 Total 66 
Source: European Works Council Bulletin, Preview Issue, Winter 1995 
4. 	 Most of the companies with existing EWCs belong to the metal or the chemical indus­
try (Table 2). This has partly to do with the simple fact that a large number of TNCs 
are operating in these sectors. Another reason may be the relatively strength of trade 
unions in these sectors. Fina1ly it is likely that TNCs in the metal and chemical industry 
are among the companies who already created the most European-wide integrated pro­
duction networks. Marginson (1992) suggests that the "organisational effect" has an 
important impact on the willingness and the interest of a TNC centra1 management to 
build up a European-Ievel labour relations forum. Hence it its remarkable that most of 
the TNCs with existing EWCs already have a very clear European Business strategy 
and very often have established a corresponding European management structure. 
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5. 	 The initiative to build up a EWC in n10st of the cases came from employee representa­
tives and the European trade unions. Nevertheless, in a few companies even central 
management took the initiative. This is more or less true for some of the French cases 
(Rehfeldt 1995) and for some other, mainly American and British, companies (Marks & 
Spencer, CPC, Lever Europe etc.). With the adoption ofthe EWC-directive, it could be 
expected that particular companies who so far were strongly opposed to EWCs will 
come forward with their own proposals to keep the whole process und er managen1ent's 
influence. The latter happened very recently, for example, in a few Japanese companies 
such as Honda, Matsushita or Sony. 
The problem with most existing studie~ on EWCs is that they mainly focus on what is said in 
the formal agreements but very often know only little about what really happens in practice. 
There is obviously an important research gap on in-depth case studies which allow for a realis­
, 
tic picture of the EWC's practical side, inc1usive of all its tensions and contradictions coming 
from the different social interests of the various social actors. Considering that the whole proc­
ess of establishing EWCs is still at its beginning it may be particularly interesting to look at the 
few "n10re advanced" examples, which already established a quite sophisticated arrangement of 
European-Ievellabour relations. 
One of the most remarkable examples is probably the case of the French F ood Corporation 
"Danone" (former named "BSN") (Schulten 1996). The Danone European-Ievellabour rela­
tions forum has existed since 1986. Meanwhile the co-operation between Danone central man­
agement and employee representatives from the various European subsidiaries has been devel­
oped quite intensively, inc1uding the adoption of four "European collective framework agree­
ments" on the issues of training, women's equality, employee's basic information rights and 
basic trade union rights in every Danone subsidiary. The "framework agreements" all follow 
the same pattern whereby a general task is defined at the European level, while implementation. 
takes place at the national or locallevel with consideration of the particular circumstances in 
, 
each company and country. All in all, Danone seems to be the first case where first steps into 
the direction of a company-specific "European collective bargaining system" have been made, 
which in the future could slowly bring a "step by step" harmonisation of certain labour relation 
issues in all European Danone subsidiaries. 
14 
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Another dilemma of present research on EWCs is, that so far the main focuses have only been 
on officially established EWCs and therefore on the relations between European central man­
agement and employee representa!ives from various national subsidiaries. There is only very 
little research on the relation among different national and/or local employee representatives in 
a single TNC. Since the early 1990s there has not only been a significant increase in the signing 
of "voluntary agreements" on EWCs, but at the same time - after creating a special EU funding 
program through the European Parliament (budget line B3-4004) - the European Industry 
Committees of the ETUC have organised a growing number of European meetings with enl­
ployee representatives coming from the same TNC (Schulten 1995b). Meanwhile there have 
been such meetings in nearly 300 separate companies (Fulton 1995), which marks the starting 
point of a build up of a European co-operation structure among employee representatives, and 
at the same time intensifies demands for negotiations on EWCs from central management. In a 
few cases like, for example, Digital Equipment (Müller 1994) or Unilever (Schulten 1996) em­
ployee representatives with support of the European trade unions built up very comprehensive 
and effective autonomous European co-operation networks, while central 
management for a long time strongly opposed any kind of European-Ievel labour relations 
framework. 
Takinginto a~count not only the officially established EWCs but also the various employee 
initiatives for a European co-operation network the map in Table 3 gives a snapshot of the 
current situation on European labour relations at the level of TNCs. Altogether it may be pos­
sible to distinguish five different categories which represent different stages and models of the 
development ofEWCs: 
1. The first category, which is still the largest one, contains the approximately 1.000 companies 
which are affected by the EWC-directive, but from where so far neither the employee repre­
sentatives nor the management has taken any initiative to create a EWCs. This category is not 
even covered by the map in Table 3. 
2. The second category which is placed in Quadrant I encloses all of the approximately 200 
companies where the employees have taken first steps for European-wide co-operation (for 
example, organised a first transnational seminar) but where there are no joint activities between 
enlployee representatives and management at the European level so far. 
3. The third category in Quadrant 11 covers the cases where the employee side already devel­
oped a regularly operating co-operation structure, while management is ignoring any demands 
, 
for an official recognition of a EWCs. 
4. The fourth category placed in Quadrant 111 includes all the companies where there are offi­
cially recognised EWCs, regularl meetings between employee representatives and central man­
agement on European level, as weIl as to a certain extent independent co-operation on the em­
ployee side. The EWCs has the distinct character of a new European company body. 
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5. Finally, the fifth category in Quadrant IV represents the companies which have an official 
agreement on a EWC and at least one annual meeting at the European level, but where in­
between these meetings there is almost no autonomous co-operation of employee representa­
tives. Many of the cases placed in this field resulted from the initiative of management repre­
sentatives. The characteristic of the EWCs is less a new company body than a regular proce­
dure (such as a forum or a workshop meeting) for information and consultation on European 
level. 
With the implementation of the EWCs-directive in the next few years, the first three categories 
will disappear., It is nevertheless unclear whether employee and trade union representatives are 
willing and able to build up independent co-operation structures to find an autonomous policy 
approach and able to establish areal counterweight to European central management. If they 
do not succeed in doing so, EWCs will be mainly influenced by management and could be used 
primarily as a new instrument ofEuropean human resource management. 
3. Transnational Corporations (TNCs) in Europe - the Emergence ofthe 
"Euro-Companytt 
The concept ofthe EWCs was "rediscovered" in the late 1980s and became politicised in the 
context of discussions on the "social dimension" of the European Single Market Programme. 
However, the main reason for its prominent role obviously has a background in radical changes 
in the structure of the world economy and its implications for employee and trade union repre­
sentation. As areaction to the fundamental crises of the basic settlements ofPost War Capital­
ism, which have been thoroughly analysed by the French Regulation School as a crisis of the 
"fordist" accumulation and regulation regime (for example: Liepitz 1992; for arecent synopsis 
of Regulation Theory see: Boyer/Saillard 1995), there has been a tremendous acceleration in 
the globalisation of economic activities since the mid-1970s (Ohmae 1990; Chesnais 1994; 
Papaconstantinou 1995). Apart from the growing intemationalisation of trade structures, the 
most significant sign of an emerging new "transnational accumulation regime" is the globalisa­
ti on of capital itself, particularly through an exorbitant growth of F oreign Direct Investment 
(FDI). Between 1960 and 1993 the world-wide stock ofFDI increased from $68 billion to $2.1 
trillion, which makes an average annual growth rate of 11 Percent (UNCTAD 1994: 131). 
Particularly in the second half of the 1980s there has been a further acceleration of the FDI 
business, reaching annual growth rates of28 Percent (UNCTAD 1993: 91). Between 1988 and 
1993 the world stock ofFDl almost doubled (Table 4). 
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Table 4: Stock offoreign investment 1988-1993 (Bi/bons ofdollars) 
Country of origin 1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 
France a 51 75 110 130 161 182 
Germany 104 121 152 173 179 196 
Japan 110 154 202 233 250 264 
United Kingdom 185 194 229 232 221 247 
United States 346 390 432 467 489 539 
World 1146 1360 1649 1822 1932 2125 
a estimated 
Source: UNCTAD (1994) 
Increasing globalisation of capital has turned Transnational Companies and Corporations 
(TNCs) into the most important social actor in today's world economy. According to figures of 
the United Nations, about 37,000 TNCs with more than 206,000 foreign subsidiaries currently 
exist (UNCTAD 1994: 3), which together control about one-third ofworld output (ibid.: 141). 
Just the world's largest 100 TNCs (without banking and assurance companies) held $3.4 tril­
lion in global assets in 1992 and controlled about one-third of the world FDI stock. (ibid.: 
XXI). While all TNCs together employ a workforce of 73 million (ibid.: 163), the top 100 
TNCs alone have 12 million workers on their payroll (ibid.: 176). Hence the group of TNCs is 
very polruised: There is a majority of smaller and medium-sized TNCs with just a small number 
of foreign subsidiaries, and there are "a few hundred corporate giants, many of them bigger 
than most sovereign nations." (Barnet/Cavanagh 1994: 14). 
Globalisation of capital during the last 20 years by way of a rapid expansion of FDI was ac­
companied by far-reaching internal restructuring processes and fundamental shifts in the TNC's 
international production strategies (Bartlett/GhoshaJ 1989). At least three types of international 
production could be distinguished (UNCTAD 1994; Campell 1994): The first type is the 
"stand-alone strategy": TNC's foreign affiliates are more or less miniature replicas ofthe par­
ent firm, organising almost the whole value-added process in the host country and having 
nearly no functionallinks to the TNC's headquarters (with the exception of technological and 
financialtransfer). The second type is the "simple integration strategy": The TNC has already 
established a certain division of labour between the parent firm and foreign affiliate, for exam­
pIe a subsidiaty produces a certain good to supply the parent company. Until the mid-1970 
these two types were clearly the dominant strategies for international production. 
Since then many TNCs looked for the new approach of a "complex integration strategy" sup­
ported by the progress of modem communication technology: "Firms following this strategy 
are no longer merely an agglomeration of discrete units, but rather all individual units are sub­
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ject to one unified strategy that governs the entire corporate system .... The geographical cov­
erage of each function can vary; some functions can be integrated globally (e.g., finance), oth­
ers regionally (e.g., production) while again others may remain entire1y local (e.g., training of 
workers). A firm pursuing complex integration strategies needs to be seen, therefore, as con­
sisting of an integrated set of corporate functions, each with (potentially) varied geography. In 
this strategy intra-firm transactions ofgoods and services play by necessity, an important role." 
(UNCTAD 1994: 140) It has been estimated, that today one-third oftotal world trade flows is 
intra-firm trade (UNCTAD 1993: 13). In summary, most of the TNCs today have developed 
an "integrated international production system 11 which "means any a:ffiliate operating in any 
foreign location potentially performs functions for the TNC as a whole or in elose interaction 
with other a:ffiliates on the basis ofa sophisticated intra-firm division oflabour" (ibid.: 158f). 
However, properly speaking it does not seem very accurate to use the term "globalisation", 
because as Bamet and Cavanagh (1994: 427) remarked: "globalisation is not really global". 
During the 1980s the inward flow ofFDI was concentrated very largely on the core industrial 
regions of the "Triad" North America, East Asia and Western Europe. Hence even the devel­
opment of transnationally integrated production networks was primarily not at an international 
but at an intra-regional level (UNCTAD 1993; CampbellI994). Western Europe thereby is the 
region with the highest share of transnational economic interaction. As Table 5 indicates, even 
in the larger European states of France, Germany, Italy and United Kingdom a significant pro­
portion of the activities in some key industrial sectors were controlled by foreign TNCs. 
Wortmann and Därrenbächer (1994) found out additionally that over 6 million people in the 
EU (based on the former 12 member states) are working at companies which are majority­
owned by a TNC based in a foreign country, under which there are about 5 million employees 
who are actually affected by the EWC-directive. 
Table 5: Industrial Sectors with the highest share ojproduction by joreign en­
terp ris es 
France 
(1988) 
Germany 
(1989) 
Italy 
(1989) 
United Kingdom 
(1989) 
Sector 0/0 Sector 0/0 Sector 0/0 Sector 0/0 
1. Computers 71 1. Computers 78 I. Computers 63 I. Computers 65 
2. Chemicals 45 2. Chemicals 39 2 Electronics 55 2. Motor vehicles 56 
3. Electronics 33 3. FoodIBeverages 21 3. Chemicals 30 3. Chemicals 37 
'T 
et. Prod. 27 4. Motor Vehicles 20 4. F oodIBeverages 15 4. Electronics 30 
I _ 
es 24 5. Basic Metals 17 5. Machines 12 5. Basic Metals 22 
Source: Papaconstantinou (1995: 219) 
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The Single Market Programme of 1986, which itself was mainly inspired by the "European 
Roundtable of industrialists" - a centrallobby organisation of European TNCs (HoIman/van 
der Pijl 1992; BornschierlFiedler 1995) - was certainly the beginning for a fundamental re­
structuring process of European capital. In contrast to earlier periods of European integration 
when there was a cIear dominance of national capital structures, since the nliddle of 1980 there 
was for the first time a significant intensification of cross-border activities. The most magnifi­
cent development was the enormous acceleration of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in 
the second half ofthe 1980s (Schulten 1992). The completion ofthe European Single 1p.arket 
forced even smaller and medium-sized businesses to reorganise their entire value chain on a 
European scale and to build up European-wide integrated production networks. Marginson 
et.al. (1993) have analysed this process as the emerging of the "Euro-Company". Independ­
ently from the (mostly still national) ownership the term "Euro-Company" is used as a "social­
economic" category which describes companies, which internally "have restructured their op­
erations so as to create unified management structures at the European level able to integrate 
production, distribution and marketing across Europe" (Marginson et.a!. 1993: 182). Röttger 
(1993), by using central categories of Regulation Theory, interprets the same process as the 
developnlent of a "new transnational European accumulation regime". 
4. Transnational Corporations and National Systems of Labour Relations in 
Europe - new developments in the "Euro-Company"? 
• 
The emergence of the "Euro-Company" cIearly has serious implications for European labour 
relations. This also leads us to the more fundamental question of the principal relation between 
TNCs and national systems of labour relations. To tackle that issue, it may be useful to recall 
very briefly the main positions in organisation theory (Heidenreich/Schmidt 1991): In the 
1950s and 1960s organisation studies were mainly dominated by a functionalist modernisation 
theory, which indicates a strong tendency for convergence because of the universal logic of 
capitalist industrialisation or even more specifically because of rational needs of modem tech­
nology. In this theoretical perspective TNCs were seen as social actors able to accelerate this 
convergence process through an international transfer ofknow-how and technology. 
In the late 1960s Perlmutter (1969) with his famous distinction between "ethnocentric", 
"polycentric" and ''geocentric'' companies tried to obtain a more precise view of the different 
internationalisation strategies (Table 6). Thereby, he already came very cIose to the more con­
temporary analysis ofBartlett and Ghoshal (1989) who distinguished between a multinational, 
a global, an international and a transnational approach. U sing Perlmutter's concept for the 
, 
issue of labour relations (Marginson/Sisson 1994), it could be said that an ethnocentric com­
pany would tried to transfer its horne country regulation system to its foreign subsidiaries, 
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while a polycentric company would mainly adopt the host countries' regulation system. Finally, 
a geocentric company would create a new form of regulation, which probably is influenced by 
both the horne and the host country's system. 
Table 6: Three Types of Headquarters Orientation Toward Subsidiaries in an 
International Enterprise l=:EthnocentricOrganisation Design Polycentric Geocentric 
Complexity of organisation ex in home country, Varied and independent hlcreasingly complex and 
in subsidiaries mterdependent 
Authority; decision making High in headquarters Relatively low in headquarters Aim for a collaborative ap­
proach between headquarters 
and subsidiaries 
Evaluation and control Home standards applied for Detennined locally Find standards which are 
persons and performance universal and local 
Rewards and punishments; High in headquarters; low in Wide variation; can be high or hlternational and 10ca1 execu­
incentives subsidiaries low rewards for subsidiary tives rewarded or reaching 
performance local and world-wide objec­
tives 
Communication; information High volume to subsidiaries Little to and from the head- Both ways and between sub-
flow order,commands,advice quarters;. Little between sub­ sidiaries. Heads of subsidiaries 
sidiaries part ofmanagement team 
Identification Nationality of owner Nationality of host country Truly international company 
but identifying with national 
interests 
Perpetuation (recruiting, Recruit and develop people of Develop people of local na- Develop best men everywhere 
staffmg, development home country for key positions tionality for key positions in in the world for key position 
everywhere in the world their own county everywhere in the world 
Source: Perlmutter (1969) 
In particular J apanese companies are reputed very often as typical representatives of an ethno­
centric approach trying to transfer the Japanese production system with its special form ofla­
bour relations into their foreign subsidiaries. However, what has been particularly observed in 
Japanese "transplants" in the United Kingdom (OliverlWilkinson 1992) is not always true in 
other European countries (Costa/Garanto 1993; Lincoln et.al. 1995). The Korean TNC Sam­
sung could be regarded as a very extreme case of an ethnocentric approach (Rassel/Schulten 
1995). After employees of Samsung's retailer organisation in Germany demanded that their 
Iocal mangers arrange for a works counciI, Samsung's central management from headquarters 
in Seoul sent a fax to its, German subsidiary saying that works councils and trade unions are not 
in line with the philosophy of the company. Hence pressing for works councils might cause 
relocation or c10sure of the German operation. Because of the headquarters' intervention, Iocal 
management tried to avoid the founding of a works council. After the Iocal trade union took 
the case to the court, the management finally had to accept the employee's right to form their 
own representation. 
The Samsung example made c1ear that an ethnocentric approach very often has its limits in 
national regulation, in particular if it is codified by law. Most studies on Human Resource 
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Management in TNCs came to the same result as the extensive empirical study of the Price 
Waterhouse Cranfield project (1991), which works out very c1early that labour relations in 
foreign-own subsidiaries show no significant differences to the horne country's companies. 
Concerning labour relatioQ.s, the overwhelming majority of TNCs therefore seemed to follow a 
polycenttic approach. This could be explained by the "societal effect theory" which was pri­
marily developed by the French "Aix-en-Provence School" and became very popular in organi­
sation studies during the 1970s and 1980s. (for example: Maurice et. al. 1980; Maurice 1991). 
Following the approach of the "societal effect" every organisation is embedded in a specific 
national "culture" and "set of social institutions" (such as labour relations, educational system, 
role of the state etc.) which has a systematic influence on a foreign-owned subsidiary's organ­
isational practice, so that it will mainly reproduce the typical national pattern. Cross-border 
comparisons of production sites in the electronic industry proved that even when subsidiaries 
used the same technology to produce the same product the organisation of work and more 
broadly the regulation oflabour relations can be very different (Hirsch-Kreinsen 1994). 
The "societal effect theory" tried to explain why there is no universal convergence of organisa­
tion structures but rather a continuing existence of national diversity. However, increasing 
globalisation of capital and the emergence of transnationaUy integrated production networks 
has also produced a kind of renewal of convergence theory (Boyer 1993). Most prominently 
this could be seen in the legendary MIT-Study, which called the traditional Toyota Production 
4 
System ("Lean production") the "universal production model of the 21 st century" (W omack 
et.al. 1990). But even if one is not arguing in such an ostentatious manner, there obviously 
have been new developments in international production which definitely have an influence on 
the organisation structure and therefore challenge the "societal effect theory". Taking the new 
dimension ofglobalisation into account does not necessarily mean denying the "societal effect", 
but probably to adds something to what Mueller (1994a) called the "organisational" and the 
"globalisation effect", which considers the company's new ability to act on a transnationallevel. 
Coming back to the discussion on the emerging Euro-Company, it now could be asked, 
whether there are new organisational and globalisation effects which might challenge the con­
temporary regulation of labour relations. Marginson and Sisson (1994: 25) suppose that the 
Euro-Company already has the "strategic potential to establish a pan-European approach to 
employee and industrial relations management". A similar view has been take by the authors of 
the United Nation's "World Investment Report 1994": "As a result ofthe creation ofthe Single 
Market and following a wave of acquisitions, mergers and alliances, large TNCs operating in 
the European ~nion have created integrated management structures at a pan-European level, 
distinct from their formerlY national organisational divisions. The new structures indicate a 
tendency for developing firm-specific employment systems or 'organisation-based' arrange­
ments for dealing with industrial relations" (UNCTAD 1994: 270). In Perlmutter's terminology 
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one may ask if the Euro-Company is likely to take if not a "geocentric" then a "eurocentric" 
approach towards labour relations. 
The hypothesis ofthe emergence of a new form ofEuropean-levellabour relations in the Euro­
Company is supported by the observation of a certain tendency of transnational convergence in 
some aspects of labour relations such as work organisation and working conditions among the 
various subsidiaries of a single TNC (Flecker/Schienstock 1994; Flecker 1995). The Euro­
Company today usually has its own conlpany network based on modern information and com­
munication technology which makes it possible to compare routinely the cost and productivity 
performance of every single subsidiary (Marginson et. al. 1995). Through intensive intra-firm 
transfers of information, know-how, technology and even personnel a TNC has a strong op­
portunity to achieve "cross-border learning effects" which allows the optimisation of organisa­
tional structures (Mueller 1994a). In principle, there are two different ways in which the Euro­
Conlpany politically can use its strategic potential to converge labour relations issues: a pri­
marily cost-oriented "social-dumping approach" and a prinlatily innovation-oriented "best­
practice approach" (Schulten 1995a). 
F ollowing the "social-dumping approach", management uses the increasing inter-firm compe­
tition among various subsidiaries to force local employee representatives to give social conces­
sions by threatening lay-offs, relocation' s or modifications of investments plans. One of the 
most spectacular examples of "social dumping" in Europe recently was the "Hoover-Case", 
where the American TNC relocated its production ofvacuum c1eaners from France to Scotland 
after the Scottish workforce accepted a far-reaching flexibility of working conditions and 
agreed to have a "no-strike-agreement" (Schulten 1995b). Even if such a "delocalisation" of 
production fa~ilities in practice is still rather exceptional, one should not underestimate the 
particular "political dimension" of social dumping (Falkner 1993). For example, in a study on 
the European automobile industry, Mueller and Purcell (1992) found that management system­
atically played one subsidiary against another to introduce night shifts and to extend the opera­
tions' time in the capital-intensive areas (gearing and engine production, press shop). After the 
first subsidiary agreed to break a certain social standard, a kind of "domino-effect" was set in 
motion (Mueller 1994b) Sooner or later all the other subsidiaries followed the same pattern. 
The "social-dumping approach" is based on the principal asymmetry ofpower between a trans­
national operating management and a mainly nationally limited employee representation. When 
management confronts their employees with a transnational comparison of locational perform­
ance in different subsidiaries, the local workforce are almost powerless, because they simply 
can not check the figures. To a certain extent, this situation could change with the establish­
ment of EWCs, if employee representatives are able to use it for an independent exchange of 
information. However, this does not mean that employees will automatically avoid social 
dumping. On the contrary, because of increasing pressure of intensifying international compe­
tition, "concession bargaining" (Sengenberger 1992; Schauer 1994) is beconung more and 
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more the dominant form of collective bargaining, and even in EWCs the employee representa­
tives are likely primarily defending their local interests. In summary, the social dumping ap­
proach could and in a race of undermined existing social standards and thereby contribute to a 
"negative convergence" of labour relation on a low level of social regulation. 
The alternative way for a TNC to use its ability of "cross-border learning" is to choose a more 
innovation-oriented "best-practice approach ", which might bring about more positive forms of 
transnational convergence in labour relations. With the fundamental crisis of the old "fordist" 
mode of production (Liepitz 1992) since the 1980s almost the whole industrial sector is in a 
far-reaching restructuring process searching for a more productive and innovative production 
model. In TNCs the introduction of new working and production methods occurs under the 
"comparative control" of the company's headquarters. Therefore, according to Schienstock 
(1992: 471) "the top management of a multinational corporation has a dominate role to play in 
the process oforganisational restructuring. It possesses the ability to interpret the environment, 
to choose the adequate strategy for recognised organisational problems and to change the or­
ganisational structures so that they fit with environment al and strategic demands. The central 
management decides what markets a firm should open up, on what business it should concen­
trate its subsidiaries and satellite firms. Strategies and organisational models are developed by 
the central management, while the division management or the management of the satellite firm 
has to decide on tactical aspects only. The latter has to provide for the smooth functioning of 
local production process." Because of its strategic access to information and knowledge the 
central management gets a key position in transferring "best-practice experiences" through the 
whole group (Mueller 1994b). 
Contrary to the mainstream "decentralisation-philosophy" in popular management literature, 
TNC headquarters keep a strategic role even in a more complex and transnationally integrated 
production network. However, what has been changed substantially is the way in which the 
central management controls its subsidiaries. Besides the traditional hierarchichal form of con­
trol through top-down orders and commands, there are now more and more indirect or 
"contextual" forms of control, mainly the establishing of market relations among the TNCs 
operations through profit centres etc. (Schienstock 1992; FleckerlSchienstock 1994). The in­
creasing intra-firm competition has forced local management to permanently improve its own 
organisation, Qrientating itself at the subsidiary with the best cost and productivity perform­
ance. Therefore, the implementation of "best-practice methods" creates a strong tendency for 
"a cross-border convergence of work organisation and conditions and quality of employment 
within integrated TNCs." (UNCTAD 1994: 271). 
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5. European Works Councils and the future of labour relations in Europe 
The above analysed tendencies of an intra-firm convergence of labour relations issues within 
the Euro-Company basically support the formation of a new form of company-specific Euro­
pean labour relations regulation. The EWC could become a new labour relations regime 
through which the spread of best-practice methods could even be accelerated with positive 
effects for both sides: a better costs and productivity performance in the various subsidiaries as 
well as an improvement of working conditions through the entire Euro-Company. In the end 
one might have the paradoxical situation that management, which so far strongly opposed the 
establishment of a legal binding EWC, will discover it as an useful instrument for transnational 
human resourpe management (Harzing/Ruysseveldt 1995). Some managers already see the 
EWCs as an opportunity to strengthen the company's European "corporate identity". For ex­
ample, at the German chemical company Schering the annual meeting of the EWC is always 
combined with a strategie meeting ofthe European personal managers (Handelsblatt 7./8. April 
1995). Keller (1995) already goes one step further in arguing that in the foreseeable future 
more and more TNCs might cometo the idea of starting collective bargaining with "its" EWCs 
in a number of non-monetary labour relations issues (e.g. work organisation, working time, 
training, equality between men and women etc.). 
However, the establishment of a new transnational "micro-corporatism" at TNC level will not 
be free from tensions and contradictions because the Euro-Company will also continue "regime 
shopping" to take advantage of the different national and/or local social standards, thereby 
playing off its national personnel against each other. It will mainly be the task of the employee 
representatives and trade unions to avoid the continuing danger of social-dumping. Therefore, 
they primarily have to form independent co-operation and communication structures able to 
equalise the management's supremacy on information about the companies transnational devel­
, 
opments. The question, if rather the "best-prac!ice" or the "social-dumping" approach will 
become dominant, will have a main influence on the functioning of a EWC. 
Finally, one could assurne that EWCs establishing new forms of labour relations regulation in 
the Euro-Company will further weaken the contemporary national systems of regulation. A 
number of comparative studies on European labour relations have already argued that since the 
mid-1980s there has been a common trend towards more decentralised, company-specific 
forms of regulation (see for example: BaglionilCrouch 1990; DeppeIWeiner 1991; 
FemerlHyman 1992). A new transnational "micro-corporatism" at the TNC level could further 
support this tendency by breaking off the Euro-Company's national subsidiaries from the na­
tional and or branch/level regulation systems. As Mueller and Purcell (1992 :31) suggests tbis 
could lead to a new segmentation of two broadly independent system of labour relations in 
Europe: "The one for large integrated companies where the focus is on plant activity and active 
works councils; the others serving the smaller domestic producers and those firms in sheltered 
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markets based on the varied traditions and practices of national industrial relations arrange­
ments." In the end there would be a growing stratification and segmentation ofthe labour force 
with a new transnationallabour "aristocracy" (Deppe 1995) formed by a relatively privileged 
core workforce of the Euro-Companies and a growing peripheral workforce in widely de­
. 
regulated labour markets. 
Following that scenario even national trade unions would be further weakened, because they 
tend to losetheir ability to create national solidarity. After being on the head ofthe European 
trade union movement for a long time, EWCs are now confronted with the danger of a poten­
tial transnational "neo-syndicalism". AB a study of the Dutch union confederation FNV is ar­
guing, from a trade union point of view what seems to be necessary is the creation of a Euro­
pean "dualistic system" on labour representation (Stoop 1994). In this political scenario EWCs 
should be integrated as trade union power. base in a European collective bargaining system at 
the supranational leveL However, for a number of reasons a "Europeanisation" of collective 
bargaining (even for all sectors or for certain branches) is not very likely at the moment 
(EbbinghausNisser 1994, Keller 1995): 
Firstly neither the European trade union organisations nor the (even more fragmented) Euro­
pean employers associations have so far met the institutional and organisational requirements 
for European ~ollective bargaining. Their financial and organisational infrastructure is still very 
weak and they have no political mandate from their national member organisations to negotiate 
or even to sign collective agreements at the European level. 
Secondly the political interests ofEuropean social actors are still dominantly defined through a 
national perspective. Both the European trade unions aswell as the European employers or­
ganisations have to deal with different national interests of their members conting from differ­
ent national systems of labour relations and reflecting different national levels of economic de­
velopment. 
Thirdly there is a fundamental contradiction between the social actors concerning the principal 
need for a European social policy. While the European trade unions are lobbying for European 
social regulation, which might be able to compensate the growing limitations of nation state's 
regulatory capacity, it is no more than ever in the interest of European employers to overcome 
the national social "restrictions" and to shift further social regulation from the state to the mar­
ket. (Streeck 1995) 
Fourthly the emergence of a European collective bargaining system is so far blocked by the 
fundamental character of the current integration process in Europe, which is still mainly inter­
governmental, dominated by nation states which prefer a form of "negative integration" 
through market forces and not through political reforms (Scharpf 1995). Therefore, the Euro­
pean Union is also not functioning as a European "would-be state" able to encourage European 
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social regulation from above (EbbinghausNisser 1994). However, there may be some funda­
mental changes after the creation of a European Monetary Union (Altvater/Mahnkopf 1993). 
In summary, even if a political strategy of integrating EWCs in a broader concept ofEuropean 
collective bargaining and thereby creating a "dualistic system" of interest representation in 
Europe seems to be very feasible from a trade union point of view, a number of barriers and 
contradictions are standing in opposition to this project. Rather, what seems to be much more 
realistic at the moment is a growth of importance of transnationallabour relations at the TNC 
level which would not lead to a converged European labour relation system, but would create 
a "transnational pluralism" of varying company-specific regulation regimes. Therefore, EWCs 
could probably become the product of a "neo-voluntarism" in European Labour Relations 
(Streeck 1994). 
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